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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This Court has granted certiorari to review the following issues:
1.

Whether section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Code proscribes payments

to a trust employed to facilitate an assignment of those payments to a creditor.
2.

Whether the Labor Commission may be obligated to direct payments

to a trust for subsequent transfer to a creditor.
Standard of review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the Court of Appeals'
decision for correctness with no deference to the Court of Appeals' conclusions of
law. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Utah 2004).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 34A-2-422

of the Utah Workers'

Compensation Act is

determinative of the issues presented by this appeal:
Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of
creditors, and from attachment or execution, and shall be paid only
to employees or their dependents.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Florida Asset Financing Corporation seeks to compel
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, a subdivision of the Utah Labor Commission,
to deliver Robert Williams' workers' compensation disability benefits to the

1

trustee of the "Robert Williams Irrevocable Trust" so that those benefits can, in
turn, be paid over to Florida Asset.1
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Florida Asset filed a
complaint in the district court against the Commission and Mr. Williams, alleging
that the Commission had wrongfully paid disability compenseition directly to Mr.
Williams instead of to the trustee of the Williams Trust. Florida Asset based its
complaint against the Commission on theories of 1) contract, 2) promissory
estoppel, and 3) secured transaction. (R. at 1.)
Florida Asset served its complaint on Mr. Williams by publication. (R. 90.)
Mr. Williams failed to appear and was defaulted. (R. at 190.) The Commission
moved for summary judgment against Florida Asset on the grounds that no
contractual relationship existed between the Commission and Florida Asset, and
that Section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Workers5 Compensation Act required the
Commission to pay Mr. Williams5 disability compensation directly to him, rather
than to the trustee of the Williams Trust. (R. at 63-70.) Florida Asset filed a
motion for partial summary judgment on its secured transaction claim against the
Commission. (R. at 93.)

1

In this brief, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and the Utah Labor Commission
are referred to jointly as "the Commission." The Employers5 Reinsurance Fund
("ERF") is established by Section34A-2-702 of the Utah Workers' Compensation
as a fund within the Utah Labor Commission for the purpose of paying permanent
total disability compensation and medical benefits to individueils such as Mr.
Williams who were injured in work-related accidents prior to July 1, 1994.

2

District Court Judge Henriod denied the Commission's motion for
summary judgment and granted Florida Asset's motion for partial summary
judgment. (R. at 222.)

Judge Henriod ordered the Commission to pay Mr.

Williams' disability compensation to the trustee of the Williams Trust for
subsequent payment over to Florida Asset.

Judge Henriod also ordered the

Commission to pay damages of $57,095.96, plus interest, to Florida Asset.
(Appendix A; R. at 222-225.)
The Commission appealed Judge Henriod's ruling to the Utah Court of
Appeals. After briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge
Henriod's decision. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of
Section 34A-2-422 required the Commission to pay Mr. Williams' workers'
compensation disability benefits directly to Mr. Williams. (Appendix B.)
This Court subsequently granted Florida Asset's petition for Writ of
Certiorari to review of the Court of Appeals' decision.
Statement of facts. Mr. Williams worked as a long-haul truck driver until
December 1990, when he was involved in a multi-vehicle accident. The accident
left him with serious head injuries and injuries to his back, shoulder and knees. (R.
at 112.)
Mr. Williams' injuries left him completely unable to work. (R. at 113;
Appendix C.) On November 17, 1994, the Utah Industrial Commission awarded

2

The Utah Industrial Commission became the Utah Labor Commission on July
1, 1997.
3

permanent total disability compensation to him. Under the Commission's order,
Mr. Williams was to receive monthly payments of disability compensation for the
remainder of his life or until further order of the Commission. (Appendix C.)
A few months later, on May 18, 1995, Mr. Williams somehow became
involved with Florida Asset in a complex financial arrangement whereby Mr.
Williams traded his future disability compensation totaling $236,624 for an
immediate cash payment of $68,706. (R. 130 and 124.) The transaction was
structured as follows.
On May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed a trust document creating the
"Robert W. Williams Irrevocable Trust," with the stated purpose to "manage" Mr.
Williams' assets and provide for his "maintenance, comfort and support." (R.
116.) However, Philip Nadel of Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as
trustee even though Mr. Williams resided in Utah. Furthermore, the Trust's sole
asset was Mr. Williams' disability compensation, and only from June 1995 to
April 2012, the exact period of time necessary for Florida Asset 1o recoup its loan.
(R. at 116.) The trust document also gave Mr. Nadel specific authority to
negotiate Mr. Williams's disability compensation checks. (R. at 120.)
Also on May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed an assignment and security
agreement in which he granted Florida Asset a security interest in the Williams
Trust to secure payment of the loan from Florida Asset. This assignment was
accepted by Joel Nadel, President of Florida Asset. Philip Nadel, as trustee of the
Williams Trust, acknowledged receipt of the assignment. (R. at 124.)
4

Finally, also on May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed what was styled an
"Irrevocable Letter of Direction." This document omitted any mention of Mr.
Williams' dealings with Florida Asset but instead merely reported that Mr.
Williams had established the Trust "to better manage (his) financial resources."
The letter directed the Commission to pay future monthly disability compensation
to Mr. Williams "to me in care of [Philip Nadel], Trustee." The document also
stated that its instructions were binding and not subject to change by Mr.
Williams. (R. at 128.) An "Acceptance" was attached to the letter purporting to
bind the Commission to the terms of the letter. (R. at 129.)
On June 1, 1995, Navada Stambaugh, an accounting technician at the
Commission, signed the "Acceptance" and also signed a letter "To Whom It May
Concern" stating that "(e)ffective June 21, 1995, (Mr. Williams') checks will be
sent in care of Philip Nadel, Trustee." (R. at 121 and 129.)
On June 14, 1995, two U.C.C. financing statements were filed in Utah. In
the first financing statement, Philip Nadel, acting as trustee of the Williams Trust,
claimed security interests in 1) Mr. Williams' future disability compensation
payments and 2) the "irrevocable letter of direction" Mr. Williams had signed. (R.
at 132.) In the second financing statement, Philip Nadel, ersatz trustee of the
Williams Trust, claimed a security interest in the Williams Trust on behalf of
Florida Asset. (R. at 133.)
Two weeks later, on June 30, 1995, and absent any default of Mr.
Williams' obligations, Florida Asset obtained a consent judgment from a Florida
5

court "directing" the Commission to pay Mr. Williams' workers' disability
benefits to Florida Asset and enjoining Williams from modifying his Irrevocable
Letter of Direction to the Commission. The Commission was not a party and was
unaware of this Florida proceeding. (R. at 136.)
For the next several years, the Commission sent Mr. Williams' monthly
disability compensation checks to the Trust. Then, during November 1999, Mr.
Williams instructed the Commission to pay his disability compensation to him.
The Commission complied with Mr.Williams' updated instructions. (R. at 142.)
This prompted Florida Asset to send a letter addressed to Ms. Stambaugh. This
letter reported for the first time that a Florida court had entered a "Final Judgment
of Garnishment" in 1997 requiring the Commission to pay Mr. Williams'
disability benefits to Florida Asset. (R. at 140.)
By this time, Ms. Stambaugh was no longer employed by the Commission.
Consequently, Florida Asset's letter came to the attention of the ERF
Administrator. It was in this manner that Commission officials first became aware
of Florida Asset's dealings with Mr. Williams. The Commission notified Florida
Asset that the Commission would comply with Mr. Williams' instructions to pay
his disability compensation directly 1o him. The Commission also advised Florida
Asset that section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Workers' Compensation exempted
disability compensation from creditors' claims and required payment of disability
compensation directly to the injured worker. (R. at 142.)

6

Florida Asset then filed suit in District Court in Washington County, Utah,
to compel Mr. Williams to redirect his disability benefits back to the Trust. Mr.
Williams failed to appear and on October 16, 2000, the District Court granted
Florida Asset's request. (R. at 144.)
On March 27, 2001, the Commission received Mr. Williams' letter
redirecting payment of his disability compensation to the Trust. (R. 147 and 148.)
However, on April 16, 2001, Florida Asset advised the Commission that Mr.
Williams had filed for bankruptcy. (R. at 148.)

The bankruptcy stay was

subsequently lifted to allow Florida Asset to pursue its claims under state law
against Mr. Williams. (R. at 150.) Mr. Williams again directed the Commission
to pay his disability benefits directly to him. The Commission advised Florida
Asset that it would comply with Mr. Williams' instructions. (R. at 153 and 154.)
Florida Asset responded by filing the District Court complaint that has led to this
proceeding before the Utah Supreme Court. (R. at 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Workers Compensation Act embodies a public policy and
legislative intent to "secure compensation to an injured employee . . . (and) to
relieve society of the care and support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial
accident." Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 185 P. 535, 537 (Utah 1919). This
purpose is accomplished by providing periodic payment of workers' compensation
disability benefits to injured workers so they can maintain their dignity and self-

7

sufficiency, and at the same time avoid the necessity of seeking charity or public
welfare.
Section 34A-2-422 implements the objectives of the Act by requiring that
all disability compensation be paid to the injured worker, and no one else.
Furthermore, section 422 exempts an injured workers5 disability compensation
from all claims of creditors until such compensation has been paid to the injured
worker.
The case now before this Court is one of first impression in Utah. It
presents the exact situation section 422 was intended to prevent. Mr. Williams,
formerly a productive and self-sufficient worker, suffered serious and permanent
head injuries and other injuries in a work-related accident. He is QOW permanently
and totally disabled. The workers' compensation system provided Mr. Williams
with monthly disability compensation sufficient to provide for his basic needs,
now and indefinitely into the future. Mr. Williams' right to receive this monthly
disability compensation was protected by section 422 of the Act.
Now, however, Florida Asset purports to have acquired the right to receive the
next 17 years of Mr. Williams' benefits, totaling $236,624, in return for a single lumpsum payment of $68,706.06. While there has been no trial in this matter, the
documentary record reveals that Florida Asset devised an elaborate plan to
circumvent the Act's protection of Mr. Williams' disability compensation. The
scheme involved trusts, assignments, "irrevocable letters of direction," security
agreements, consent decrees and default judgments, all with the purpose of
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keeping Mr. Williams' disability compensation out of Mr. Williams' hands and
diverting the disability compensation to Florida Asset's o w n benefit.
Nevertheless, section

12

protects

>."••<.

.

•.

Mr. Williams' disability compensation,

before payment, is exempt from all claims of creditors.

This precludes Florida

A s s e t ' s attempts to tie up Mr. Williams' future disability compensa:<*>n
section 422 provide^ llnil h 11 \\ 1111 11
((» l\It

N• S

Williams.

v

11s,ihi 111 \ 11111ipensation shall be paid only

This precludes payment of the compensation to the Williams

Trust for the benefit of Florida Asset.
The Court Commission r.'i

?v compelled to pay Mr. Williams' disability compensation to

anyone other than
with the r
rcspct •• •

vppeals has iqiv'Uil Hiiriilii Assrl s argument that the

)

Williams.

The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent

language and publn

pohev ul su lion '"I1",""

1 In ConimisMon

Ihis ('oijrl lo affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
ARGUMENT

P O I N T O N E : T H E P L A I N L A N G U A G E O F S E C T I O N 422
PROTECTS MR. WILLIAMS5 DISABILITY
BENEFITS
F R O M ALL CREDITORS' CLAIMS AND
REQUIRES
P A Y M E N T ONLY TO MR. WILLIAMS.
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute itself.
In State v. Redd, 992 | \ 2 d 1>X(>. W i l l i "(JII M W , IIIIS Couil observed:
W e start our analysis with the statute's plain language. "The
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are
generally to be construed according to their plain language.
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to
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contradict its plain meaning." Zoll & Branch P.C v. Assay, 932
P.2d at 594; Kimball Condo. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. Of
Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997).
The meaning of section 422 is plain, unambiguous, and mandatory. It
provides that "Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of
creditors, and from attachment or execution, and shall be paid only to employees
or their dependents."(Emphasis added.)
Section 422 has been a part of the Act since it was first adopted in 1917;
similar provisions are common in other states' workers' compensation laws. The
effect of these provisions is summarized in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law,
Volume 4, § 89.07:
The personal character of compensation payments also results in
their being made nonassignable under the typical act. No outside
agreement or even court order can give a compensation board power
to order payment of such benefits to anyone but the persons
specified in the statute.
Section 422 consists of two parts. As its first part, section 422 provides that
"compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and
from attachment or execution . . . ." Section 422's second part requires that
compensation "shall be paid only to employees or their dependents."

The

significance of each part is discussed below.
A. Until Mr. Williams' Disability Compensation Is Actually Paid, It Is
Exempt From All Claims Of Creditors.
Section 422 specifies that "compensation before payment shall be exempt
from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution." In its initial brief

10

to this Court, Florida Asset argues it is not seeking to attach, execute against, or
otherwise make a claim against Mr. Williams' compensation before that
compensation has been paid to Mr. Williams. Instead, Florida Asset asserts it
merely seeks to exercise its security interest against the Williams Trust. But that
is not the full story.
If Florida Asset were only seeking to exercise its rights against the
Williams Trust, the Commission would not be involved in this controversy and the
dispute would be entirely between Florida Asset and Mr. Williams. However,
Florida Asset recognizes that the Williams Trust has no assets or source of income
other than an expectancy of receiving Mr. Williams' future
compensation.

disability

Consequently, it is imperative to Florida Asset that the

Commission turn over Mr. Williams' future disability compensation directly to the
Trust. To achieve that end, Florida Asset has devised the so-called "irrevocable
letter of direction." This document applies to Mr. Williams' future disability
compensation and prohibits the Commission from paying that future disability
compensation to anyone other than the trustee of the Williams Trust.3
In this context, the validity of the "irrevocable letter of direction" is the
lynchpin to Florida Asset's scheme. The "irrevocable letter of direction," coupled
with the terms of the Williams Trust, the assignment, and the security agreements,
constitutes an attempt by Florida Asset to perfect its claim against Mr. Williams'
3

Of course, as soon as the disability compensation check was delivered to Philip
Nadel, trustee of the Williams Trust, he would deposit it in the Trust and then pay
it over to Florida Asset and its President, Joel Nadel.
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future disability compensation before that disability compensation has been paid to
Mr. Williams.
While Florida Asset's efforts may be "creative/' as characterized by the
Court of Appeals, those efforts nevertheless run afoul of the protection afforded by
section 422, which provides that "compensation before payment shall be exempt
from all claims of creditors. . . ." (Emphasis added.) By its plain language, the
statute exempts Mr. Williams' compensation from all claims of creditors,
including Florida Asset's claim as represented by the "irrevocable letter of
direction" and other associated devices.
B. Mr, Williams' Disability Compensation Can Only Be Paid To Him.
Section 422 mandates that compensation "shall be paid only to employees
or their dependents." It is difficult to imagine a statutory provision that could be
less ambiguous.
Despite section 422's clear requirement that Mr. Williams' disability
compensation shall be paid only to Mr. Williams, Florida Asset argues that the
Commission should deliver Mr. Williams' disability compensation to Philip Nadel
as trustee of the Williams Trust. Florida Asset persists in this argument even
though it is established that any disability compensation delivered to Philip Nadel
is never paid to Mr. Williams, but is remitted directly to Florida Asset.
Furthermore, Mr. Williams has specifically instructed the Commission to deliver
his disability compensation directly to him.

12

Accepting Florida Asset's arguments would result in payment of Mr.
Williams' disability compensation to Florida Asset. Such a result would not only
be inconsistent with section 422, but would turn the statute on its head. Section
422 should be applied according to its plain language—Mr. Williams' disability
compensation should be paid only to Mr. Williams.
C. Decisions From Other Jurisdictions Can Be Distinguished From the
Circumstances of Mr, Williams' Case.
Florida Asset has cited several decisions from other jurisdictions in support
of its claim to Mr. Williams' disability compensation. Each of those decisions is
distinguishable from the circumstances presented here.
Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Antonelli, 504 N.E. 2d 717 (Ohio 1987),
addresses the ability of a judgment creditor to attach funds in the debtor's bank
account, which funds were the proceeds from workers' compensation benefits that
had already been paid directly to the injured worker/debtor, free from any preexisting claims of creditors. Unlike the circumstances now before this Court, the
creditor in Ohio Bell did not assert any claim to injured worker's disability
compensation before payment of the compensation to the injured worker, nor did
the creditor attempt to prevent the compensation from being paid to the injured
worker.
In Romero v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808 (N. M. 1991), a medical provider treated
an injured worker for his work-related injuries, then sought payment for his
services by enforcing an assignment against a workers' compensation settlement

13

that was held by the injured worker's attorney. Applying a statute very similar to
section 422 to the unique facts of Romero, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the medical provider was entitled to payment. However, the New Mexico
Court observed that the result might be different under different facts:

"We

believe that a meritorious claim of illegality may be raised by a worker with
respect to the settlement proceeds of the worker's compensation claim in the event
his or her attorney should withhold for medical providers any sums not received
by the attorney for that specific purpose." Romero at 811. In other words, the New
Mexico Court may have concluded that the medical provider was entitled to
payment out of the workers' compensation settlement fund because the medical
provider had treated the work-related injury.
Finally, federal court decisions in In re Soma, 43 F.3d 637 (11 th Cir. 1995)
and First Colony Life Ins, Co. v. Berube, 130 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1997) addressed
creditors' rights to annuity proceeds that had been purchased with workers'
compensation proceeds. The Soma and Berube courts did not address creditors'
rights to the workers' compensation payments themselves.
In summary, the circumstances of each of the foregoing decisions are
different than the facts of this case. Consequently, these other decisions provide
little guidance with respect to the unique circumstances of this case.

The

Commission believes that Mr. William's right to receive his disability
compensation must be resolved according to the plain language of section 422.

14

POINT TWO: FLORIDA ASSET'S CLAIM AGAINST MR.
WILLIAMS' DISABILITY BENEFITS IS CONTRARY TO
PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF
SECTION 422 IN PARTICULAR AND THE WORKERS5
COMPENSATION ACT IN GENERAL.
While the process of statutory interpretation must begin with the language
of the statute itself, the Utah Supreme Court has also observed that:
"(t)he primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the state was
meant to achieve. Although we generally rely on the plain language
rule of statutory construction, we note that an equally important rule
is that a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and with the
overall legislative objective of the statute."
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984); (internal
citations omitted.) See also Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d at
1205. It is therefore appropriate to consider the purpose and objective of
Section422 within the larger context of the workers' compensation system.
This Court's comments in Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 185 P. at
537, decided only two years after the Utah legislature created the state's workers'
compensation system, bear repeating:
The beneficent purposes of the (workers' compensation) act, and of
similar acts, have been repeatedly stated by the courts of this and
other states. It has not only for its object to secure compensation to
an injured employee or to those dependent upon one killed by
accident while so employed, but to relieve society of the care and
support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial accident.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the workers' compensation system is intended to provide an injured
worker with benefits that replace, to some extent, the wages that the worker would
15

have earned and used to support himself or herself, and any dependents. As
explained in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §1.03(5), p. 1-10:
A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not
pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she has tost; it gives
claimant a sum which, added to his or her remaining earning ability,
if any, will presumably enable claimant to exist without being a
burden to others.
An award of workers' compensation disability benefits is "the signal for the
setting in motion of a scheme of social protection which goes no further in nature,
amount, or duration than the necessities of the protection require." Ibid. p. 1-12.
Chief Justice Cardozo of the Newr York Court of Appeals eloquently expressed
this objective of workers' compensation systems in Surace v. Danna, 161 N.E.
315 (N.Y. 1923):
. . . . The Workmen's Compensation Law was framed to
supply an injured workman with a substitute for wages during the
whole or at least a part of the term of disability. He was to be saved
from becoming one of the derelicts of society, a fragment of human
wreckage. (Citations omitted.) He was to have enough to sustain
him in a fashion measurably consistent with his former habits of life
during the trying day of readjustment. The cost of such support
becomes a charge upon the industry without regard to fault.
Rehabilitation of the man, not payment of his ancient debts, is the
theme of the statute, and its animating motive.
In more prosaic terms, it is fundamental to workers' compensation systems
that injured workers have a continuing source of income to meet their basic needs
and to prevent them from becoming a charge on society. This principle holds true
in Utah, where protections for the injured worker's "stream of income" is woven
throughout the Act, as follows:
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Periodic payment of disability benefits. All disability compensation paid
pursuant to the Act, whether for temporary disability under Section34A-2-410,
permanent partial disability under Section34A-2-412, or permanent total disability
under Section34A-2-413, is calculated on a weekly basis and paid in monthly
installments over time. Thus, the method of computation and payment of benefits
is intended to provide a continuing source of income to the injured worker.
Requirement of Commission approval.

Section 34A-2-421 of the Act

specifically limits lump-sum payments of disability benefits to only those cases
presenting special circumstances, and only with the approval of one of the
Commission's Administrative Law Judges, as follows:
An administrative law judge, under special circumstances and
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic benefits
to one or more lump-sum payments.
Thus, Section 34A-2-421 represents another manifestation of legislative
purpose to maintain disability compensation as a continuing source of income for
injured workers.
Recent legislative action:

Recent amendments to the Act reiterate

legislative intent that any proposal to modify payment of benefits must be
approved by the Commission. In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended what is now
Section 34A-2-420 of the Act by adding subsection (4) (emphasis added):
(4) . . . an administrative law judge shall review and may approve
the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a)
compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or
death benefit entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act; or
17

(b)
commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical,
disability, or death benefit entitlements under this chapter or Chapter
3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured settlement, or other
appropriate payout.
Once again, the legislature has protected the injured worker's ability to rely
on a continuing source of income by requiring Commission approval of any
"commutation," "settlement," "lump sum payment" or "structured settlement."
The preceding paragraphs of this brief set forth the protections for periodic
payment of benefits that are embedded in the Act.

In Utah Copper Co. v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 193 P. 24, 27 (Utah 1920), the Utah Supreme
Court discussed the necessity of such provisions:
Society is interested in seeing that industries bear the expense
of caring for those injured while working in such industries, as well
as in seeing that the dependents of workmen losing their lives in
such industries shall be protected and given at least some of the
comforts of which they are deprived by the death of the provider.
The Legislature wisely gave to the commission some discretion as to
the time of payment and the application of the same to the support of
the different dependents. It is a matter of common knowledge and
human experience that in a great many cases it would be
unreasonable waste to pay the entire amount of an award in a lump
sum, and it would be criminal neglect to fail to see to it that the
award, when paid, is used for the support of the minor children, left
defenseless by the death of the father. The mother, often without
business experience or any knowledge of financial affairs, would too
frequently become the victim of unscrupulous, or, possibly, too
optimistic promoters, and in a few short months the money awarded
for the protection of the children of the deceased would, if released
from the control of the commission, be invested in worthless
securities. To defend against such losses the commission retains
control of the award, and may direct its distribution among the
dependents in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
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Although the Supreme Court's discussion in Utah Copper Co. is framed in
terms of dependents' benefits, its underlying concerns and principles apply with
equal force to benefits payable to injured workers. The Supreme Court's concerns
certainly resonate with respect to the circumstances of Mr. Williams' case, now
before this Court.
POINT III: THE COMMISSION, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
UTAH'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM AND
ALSO AS THE AGENCY WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY
MR. WILLIAMS' DISABILITY BENEFITS, IS AN
INTERESTED PARTY IN THIS DISPUTE.
In Point II of its brief, Florida Asset argues that "the Commission is not
empowered to hear and determine private disputes" such as the proper payment of
Mr. Williams' disability compensation. Florida Asset's argument misstates the
role the Commission has actually taken in this dispute.
For two separate reasons, the Commission does have a legitimate interest in
assuring proper payment of Mr. Williams' disability compensation. First, Section
34A-1-104(5) of the Utah Labor Commission Act authorizes the Commission to
"administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health and safety, of
employees." Thus, the Commission has a general duty to see that the workers'
compensation system is properly implemented. Second, the Commission, through
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is actually liable to pay Mr. Williams'
disability compensation. The Commission therefore has a specific duty to see that
the disability compensation is properly paid.
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While it is true, for the two reasons stated above, that the Commission is
interested in this dispute, it is not true as suggested by Florida Asset that the
Commission has attempted to "hear and determine" this dispute. To the contrary,
the Commission has submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court and appellate
courts for judicial determination of this matter.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of section 422 requires the Commission to pay Mr.
Williams' workers9 compensation disability benefits to Mr. Williams, and no one
else. The plain language of section 422 also exempts the disability benefits due
Mr. Williams from all claims of creditors.
Section 422, together with other provisions of the Act, implement a
fundamental public policy of ensuring that injured workers have a source of
income to obtain the necessities of life, without the need to turn to charity or
welfare.
The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with the plain language of
section 422 and the public policy embodied by the entire Workers' Compensation
Act. The Commission respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals'
decision.
Submitted this 12th day of May, 2005.

Alan Hennebold
Utah Labor Commission and
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FLORIDA ASSET FINANCING
CORPORATION, a Florida corporation,
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vs.
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individual,
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AND
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COMMISSION AND EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND

Defendants.
Civil No. 020906799
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

The Motion to Dismissfiledby Defendants, Utah Labor Commission and the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund (collectively the "Commission"), and the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Florida Asset Financing Corporation ("FAFC"), came on for hearing
before the Court on February 24, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Mark R. Gaylord and Craig H. Howe
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appeared on behalf of FAFC. Sandra L. Steinvoort appeared on behalf of the Commission.
Based on the supporting and opposing memoranda, the arguments of counsel, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Commission's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied;

2.

FAFC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted;

3.

FAFC is hereby entitled to enforce its interest in the Irrevocable Letter of

Direction and in the Trust Agreement by directing the Commission to pay Robert Williams'
disability benefits in accordance with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction;
4.

The Commission is hereby ordered to comply with the Irrevocable Letter of

Direction by, among other things, paying Williams' benefits to him in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, whereby Williams irrevocably
directed that his "future payment(s)" be sent to him "in care of PHILIP NADEL, Trustee of the
ROBERT W. WILLIAMS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, at 7777 Glades Road, Suite 110, Boca
Raton, FL 33434 or to such other address as the Trustee may designate in writing";
5.

The Commission is hereby barred and prohibited from interfering with FAFC's

rights to enforce its interest in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and in the Trust Agreement,
including, but not limited to, a prohibition against paying Williams' benefits in any manner
contrary to the terms of the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and/or contrary to this Order;
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6.

Judgment in favor of FAFC and against the Commission is hereby entered in the

amount of $57,095.96, which shall be augmented by post-judgment interest at the highest legal
rate.
7.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly

determines that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Judgment on the claims raised
in FAFC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and expressly directs the entry of
judgment on those claims.
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2003.
BY THE Couitf:

Honorable Stephen L. Henripd
Third Judicial District Cotfft'
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General!
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Attorneys for Utah Labor Commission and
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
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TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT AGAINST UTAH LABOR COMMISSION AND
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, on
the following:
Sandra L. Steinvoort, Esq.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
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.3d 43 6, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2 004)
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98 P.3d 436

506 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2004 UT App 273

Court of Appeals of Utah.
FLORIDA ASSET FINANCING CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; Employers' Reinsurance Fund; and Robert W. Williams, an individual, Defendants
and Appellants.

No- 20030535-CA.
Aug. 19, 2004.
ckgroundz Secured creditor of workers' compensation claimant filed action
nst Labor Commission, seeking to compel Commission to comply with
vocable letter directing Commission to pay claimant's disability payments to
t for his benefit. The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Stephen
enriod, J., granted secured creditor's motion for partial summary judgment,
ordered Commission to pay damages to secured creditor. Commission appealed.
lding: The Court of Appeals, Pamela T. Greenwood, J., held, as a matter of
t impression, that Commission had to comply with claimant's direction to
his disability payments directly to him, even though claimant had
iously sent Commission an "irrevocable letter" directing Commission to pay
disability payments to a trust established for his benefit, and had assigned
interest in trust to a creditor to secure debt.

versed and remanded.
West Headnotes
Exemptions c@:^::>62
163
1631 Nature and Extent
1631(D) Liabilities Enforceable Against Exempt Property
163k62 Exceptions from Exemptions in General.
ah's exemption statute does not explicitly prohibit the assignment of
:ers' compensation benefits received; it precludes only attachment or
:ution. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
® 2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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98 P.3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 200'
[2]

Workers' Compensation <£=:>1098
413
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment.

An injured worker who has received workers' compensation may voluntarily
issign those benefits to a creditor or other third party. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-42
3]

Workers' Compensation <2^1098
413
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment.

No assignment of funds is effective if it attempts to transfer workers'
ompensation benefits prior to possession of the compensation by the recipient.
.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
4]

Workers' Compensation <®^1003
413
413X Payment of Compensation and Compliance with Award
413X(A) Mode of Payment or Compliance m General
413kl003 In General.
[See headnote text below]

I]

Workers' Compensation <@^1004
413
413X Payment of Compensation and Compliance with Award
413X(A) Mode of Payment or Compliance in General
413kl004 Payment to Representatives of Persons Entitled and Others.
[See headnote text below]

]

Workers' Compensation ^S^lOgO
413
413X11 Administrative Officers and Boards
413kl090 Powers and Duties m General.

While the Labor Commission is obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits
rectly to the injured worker or the worker's dependents, after payment of the
mpensation, whether m a lump-sum or monthly installments, the direction and
e of the funds is outside the control and mandate of the Commission.
C.A.1953, 34A-2-422; U.A.C. R612-1-6, subd. A.
@
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3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004)
Workers' Compensation <®^::>1098
413
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment.
Lie a workers' compensation recipient could technically assign the right to
re compensation payments, in Utah, such an assignment is not enforceable
ist the Labor Commission, and only against the recipient after payment is
Lved. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
Exemptions <®^3 7
163
1631 Nature and Extent
1631(C) Property and Rights Exempt
163k37 Specific Exemptions in General.
ah's exemption statute, by protecting workers' compensation benefits from
claims of creditors before payment to employees, requires that the worker is
tied to actual receipt of the benefits. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
Workers' Compensation <®^?1098
413
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment.
.though a creditor is not expressly prohibited from obtaining an assignment
/orkers' compensation benefits after receipt by the worker, it is clear that
l an arrangement is a remedy or procedure for the recovery or collection of a
:. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
Workers' Compensation < @^1098
413
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment.
abor Commission had to comply with workers' compensation claimant's direction
send his disability payments directly to him, even though claimant had
piously sent Commission an "irrevocable letter" directing Commission to pay
disability payments to a trust established for his benefit, and had assigned
interest in trust to a creditor to secure debt; otherwise, Commission would
in untenable position of trying to determine the validity of assignment made
claimant, and forced to discern the legitimacy of creditor's claim to the
efits. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422.
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Mark R. Gaylord, Craig H. Howe, and Matthew L. Moncur, Ballard Spahr Andrews
Ingersoll, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
il 1 The Utah Labor Commission (the Commission) appeals the trial court's gran
)f *438 Florida Asset Financing Corporation's (Florida Asset) motion for
>artial summary judgment, and the trial court's order that the Commission pay
57,095.96 in damages to Florida Asset. Specifically, the Commission contends
hat the trial court erred in interpreting Utah Code Annotated section 34A-2-42
2 0 01). We reverse.
BACKGROUND
^ 2 In 1990, Robert Williams, a truck driver, was involved in a traffic
incident while working. Williams suffered serious head, back, shoulder, and
lee injuries in the accident. In November 1994, the Utah Industrial Commissioi
7N1) awarded permanent total disability compensation to Williams. Under the
Dmpensation order, Williams was awarded monthly disability benefits for the
*mainder of his life or until further ordered by the Commission.
1 3 In May 1995, Williams signed a security agreement and promissory note witl
.orida Asset in exchange for a loan of $68,706.06. The note provided that
ipayment of the loan would be via monthly payments from June 1995 to April
>12. To secure the note, Williams established the "Robert W. Williams
•revocable Trust" (Trust). The stated purpose of the Trust was the "management
certain of [WilliamsJ's assets" and for the "maintenance, comfort, and
pport of [Williams]." The security agreement and note signed by Williams
signed and transferred all of his interest in the Trust to Florida Asset as
curity for payment of the loan. Additionally, as provided for in the Trust
cument, Williams sent the Commission an "Irrevocable Letter of Direction,"
ich informed the Commission of the Trust, and directed the Commission to pay
lliams's disability payments to him in care of Philip Nadel, trustee of the
ast. Finally, prior to any default, Williams stipulated to a consent decree
Led in Alachua County, Florida Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an
snded Consent Final Judgment (First Florida Judgment) on June 30, 1995,
Dhibiting Williams from modifying the Irrevocable Letter of Direction. In May
55, the Commission agreed in a letter to Williams to honor the terms of the
revocable Letter of Direction. In a separate letter sent on the same day, the
mission agreed to send the checks payable to Williams to Nadel as trustee of
> Trust.
f

4 For several years, the Commission sent Williams's monthly disability
.efits to the Trust. In 1997, Williams defaulted under the terms of the
missory note and security agreement. (FN2) As a result, the Florida Circuit
2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004)
entered the Second Amended Final Judgment (Second Florida Judgment)
ing Florida Asset a judgment against Williams, in the sum of $216,933.71
nder the note and $110 0 in attorney fees.
(FN3) In November 1999,
ams instructed the Commission to send the compensation payments directly to
ather than to the Trust. The Commission complied with Williams's updated
-uctions. In June 2 000, Florida Asset attempted to enforce both Florida
tents by filing them in the Fifth District Court, Washington County, Utah,
ams failed to appear at a subsequent hearing, and in October 2000, the
court ordered Williams to redirect his compensation benefits to the Trust,
I on the two Florida orders and the Irrevocable Letter of Direction. After
.ams refused to redirect the payments, the trial court issued a warrant and
.ams was eventually arrested for contempt. At a followup hearing, by order
le court, Williams signed a letter redirecting payments to the Trust.
> In late March 2001, shortly after redirecting payments back to the Trust,
.ams filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Due to the bankruptcy, the
Lssion did *439 not implement Williams's court ordered instructions to
:ect the payments to the Trust. In July 2001, the bankruptcy court granted
Lda Asset relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue its claims under
* law. After receiving a copy of the Order for Relief from the automatic
, the Commission notified Florida Asset that it intended to honor the
ructions Williams had signed redirecting payments back to the Trust, but
ise of a six-month advance paid to Williams no "additional benefits [would]
aid until December 2001."
In November 2001, the Commission notified
ida Asset that Williams had once again updated his instructions and
rected payment of the benefits directly to him, and that the Commission
nded to honor Williams's latest instruction.
6 Florida Asset responded in July 2002, by filing a complaint in the Third
rict Court against the Commission and Williams. The trial court entered a
ult judgment against Williams after he failed to timely answer the
laint. The Commission moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no
ractual relationship existed between Florida Asset and the Commission,
ida Asset filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its secured
saction claims. The trial court denied the Commission's motion to dismiss
granted Florida Asset partial summary judgment. The trial court ordered the
dssion to comply with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and awarded
•ida Asset judgment against the Commission in the amount of $57,095.96. The
dssion appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
7 The Commission argues that Utah Code Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001)
tires it to pay Williams's benefits to him directly, and precludes payment to
"ida Asset through the Trust. " ' [M]atters of statutory construction are
stions of law that are reviewed for correctness.' " Esguivel
v.
Labor
n'n, 2000 UT 66,% 13, 7 P.3d 777 (quoting Platts
v. Parents
Helping
Parents,
P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997)). "In addition, ' [w]here the issue is a question
Law, ... appellate review gives no deference to the trial judge's or agency's
® 2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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98 P.3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 200
determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what
the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.' " I
(quoting Drake v. Industrial
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (alteration,
in original) (other quotations and citation omitted)).
ANALYSIS
I. Utah Code Annotated Section 34A-2-422
% 8 The Commission argues that by granting Florida Asset's motion for partial
summary judgment, the trial court misinterpreted the plain language of Utah Coc
Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001), which states: "Compensation before payment
shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution,
m d shall be paid only to employees or their dependents."
Id.
1 9 In this case, Florida Asset seeks to compel the Commission to ignore
filliams's most recent direction and pay the benefits according to his previous
lirection and the contract between Williams and Florida Asset. The
nterpretation of section 34A-2-422 in this context presents an issue of first
mpression in Utah. When interpreting the plain language of a statute, " ' [w]e
ssume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory
ords are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
noperable. ' " Gillman
v. Sprint
Communications
Co., 2004 UT App 143,11 7, 91
.3d 858 (quoting Carlie
v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996)).
f 10 Statutes similar to section 34A-2-422 exempting worker's compensation
snefits from creditors' claims vary significantly from state to state, as do
Durt interpretations of these laws. We therefore begin with a preliminary
Lscussion of other states' exemption statutes and interpretations to assist in
jtr analysis of Utah's statute.
A. Assignment of Benefits
il 11 First, unlike Utah's, most states' exemption statutes explicitly prohibit
le assignment of benefits. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. *440
§ 23-1068 (2004)
Compensation, whether determined or not, is not, prior to the delivery of the
Lrrant therefor, assignable."); Cal. Labor Code § 4900 (2004) ("No claim for
>mpensation, except as provided in Section 96, is assignable before payment,
t this provision does not affect the survival thereof."); Fla. Stat. ch.
0.22 (2004) ("No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or
nefits due or payable under this chapter ... shall be valid....");
.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 342.180 (2004) ("No claim for compensation under this
apter shall be assignable.... All compensation and claims therefor, except
ild support obligations, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors.");
v.Rev.Stat. 616C.205 (2004) ("[C]ompensation payable or paid ..., whether
termined or due, or not, is not, before the issuance and delivery of the
eck, assignable, is exempt from attachment, garnishment and execution, and
as not pass to any other person by operation of law.").
2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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,3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004)
L2 Interpreting Florida's exemption statute specifically prohibiting
jnments, a Florida Court of Appeals invalidated a financial arrangement
Lar to the one in this case. In J.G. Wentworth,
S.S.C.
v. Safeco
Life
ranee Co., 755 So.2d 138 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), an injured employee
jned the right to her future worker's compensation benefits in exchange for
sh payment. See id. at 138.
After directing the payments to be paid to
estate, she signed a will transferring the estate's interest in the payments
le plaintiff lender. See id.
The court held that the entire arrangement,
iding her change of beneficiary, was an invalid assignment. See id. at
39.
Thus, we note that the arrangement between Florida Asset and Williams
3 be unenforceable under Florida law. Moreover, several court decisions
noted that where assignment of benefits is specifically prohibited, that
ibition extends to funds that are traceable or identifiable to compensation
fits. See, e.g., In Re Delgado,
967 F.2d 1466, 1467 (10th Cir.1992);
ard v. Jacksonville
Med. Ctr., 690 So.2d 589, 592 (Fla.1997); Highland
Park
e Bank v. Salazar,
555 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.App.1977).
13 A few states, including Utah, do not expressly prohibit assignments in
r exemption statutes. Utah's statute provides that compensation "shall be
pt from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution." Utah
Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001). Ohio and New Mexico's exemption statutes are
ly identical to Utah's. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-52 (2004) (
pensation benefits shall be exempt from claims of creditors and from any
chment, garnishment or execution and shall be paid only to such worker or
personal representative...."); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4123.67 (2004) (
ept as otherwise provided ..., compensation before payment shall be exempt
all claims of creditors and from any attachment or execution, and shall be
only to the employees or their dependents.");
see also Tex. Lab.Code Ann.
8.201 (2004) ("Benefits are exempt from: (1) garnishment; (2) attachment;
judgment; and (4) other actions or claims."). Court decisions in these
es have noted that in the absence of statutory language prohibiting
gnments, an injured worker could assign his benefits. See Romero v.
Earl,
N.M. 789, 810 P.2d 808, 811 (1991); Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Antonelli,
29
St.3d 9, 504 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1987); Highland
Park State
Bank, 555 S.W.2d
88.
] f 14 Comparing Utah's exemption statute to those of other states, it is
r that section 34A-2-422 does not explicitly prohibit the assignment of
fits received. Our statute precludes only attachment or execution. If the
legislature wishes to prohibit injured workers from assigning compensation
tents, we encourage it to change the language of section 34A-2-422 to make
intention clear. That is a matter, however, for the legislature to
ess.
B. Payment of Benefits
15 Another significant difference between Utah's and other states' exemption
utes is that section 34A-2-422 limits the exemption's protection against
Lchment or execution to "compensation before payment." Utah Code Ann. §
® 2 005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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34A-2-422 (2001). Other exemption statutes use broader Language allowing for
protection of benefits either before *441 and/or after they are received by
:he worker. See, e.g.,
Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1068 (2004) (referring to
1
[c]ompensation, whether determined or not"); Fla. Stat. ch. 440.22 (2004)
[stating no assignment "due or payable"); Nev.Rev.Stat. 616C.205 (2004)
[providing that "compensation payable or paid ..., whether determined or due, c
lot."); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-52 (2004) (referring only to "[c]ompensation
>enefits" being exempt); Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.201 (2004) (stating only tha
[b]enefits" are exempt). Only Ohio's statute uses the same limiting language
LS Utah, prohibiting attachment or execution of "[c]ompensation before payment.
>hio Rev.Code Ann. § 4123.67 (2004). (FN4)
K 16 In Parker
v. Indus.
Commission,
87 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (1935), (FN5)
he Utah Supreme Court examined the limits of Utah's exemption statute. The
ourt noted that nothing in the statute prevented injured workers from using
heir compensation to pay creditors, but stated that the purpose was to protect
enefits from creditors "before the employee reduces it to his possession."
Id
t 278.
Likewise, in Ohio Bell Telephone
Co., the Ohio Supreme Court,
nterpreting an exemption statute identical to Utah's, stated that Ohio's
tatute "exempts workers' compensation benefits only f b e f o r e payment' is made t
claimant. There is no exemption of benefits from attachment provided for
nder either statute after
the award has been paid to the claimant." 504 N.E.2«
t 718.
K 17 Finally, Utah's exemption statute differs from many other states'
batutes because it explicitly provides that benefits "shall be paid only to
nployees or their dependents." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001). This
•atutory provision is reflected in an administrative rule promulgated by the
:ah Labor Commission that states: "Any entity issuing compensation checks or
rafts must make those checks/drafts payable directly
to the injured worker and
ist mail them directly to the last known mailing address of the injured
Drker."
Utah Admin. Code R612-1-6(A) (2004) (emphasis added).
[2][3][4][5] U 18 Given the plain language of section 34A-2-422, and the
lpreme court's statements in Parker,
an injured worker who has received
>mpensation may voluntarily assign those benefits to a creditor or other third
irty. However, it is equally clear that no assignment of funds is effective if
- attempts to transfer benefits prior to possession of the compensation by the
icipient. See Parker,
50 P.2d at 278; Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., 504 N.E.2d at 718.
ider section 34A-2-422, and rule 612-1-6(A), the Commission is obligated to pa>
Le benefits directly to the injured worker or the worker's dependents. After
/yment of the compensation, whether in a lump-sum or monthly installments, the
rection and use of the funds is outside the control and mandate of the
•mmission. (FN6)
K 19 Furthermore, it is significant to highlight that in those cases from
her states where a creditor was seeking to attach or garnish compensation
yments pursuant to an assignment or other agreement, in no case was the payor
ate agency ordered to make the payments directly to the creditor. See,
e.g.,
® 2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.
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.3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004)
o v. Cinco Star,
Inc.,
755 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) (permitting
holding petitioner's compensation proceeds to disburse proceeds to secured
ltor first, then remainder to petitioner)/ Highland
Park State
Bank v.
zar, 555 S.W.2d 484, *442 488 (Tex.App.1977) To view preceding link please
k here
(allowing bank to recover compensation proceeds held m a savings
ant after appellee defaulted on bank loan with account pledged as security);
Bell
Tel. Co., 504 N.E.2d at 718 (holding that creditor telephone company
d attach compensation proceeds held in bank account because payments had
ady been paid to worker).
II. Williams's Arrangement With Florida Asset
20 In light of this background analysis of Utah's exemption statute, we turn
he facts presented in this case. Shortly after receiving an award of
ensation for his injuries, Williams pledged his future benefits worth
,624.00 to Florida Asset as security for a loan of $68,706.06. As part of
transaction, Williams established the Trust, and named a Florida resident,
lp Nadel, as the trustee. While the Trust's stated purpose was to provide
Williams's "maintenance, comfort and support," the Trust's only asset was
benefits payments to be received from 1995 to 2012, the precise length of
required to satisfy Williams's promissory note with Florida Asset,
lly, Williams sent an Irrevocable Letter of Direction to the Commission
esting that all compensation payments be made to him, in care of the Trust.
21 Although the checks were sent by the Commission to Williams in care of
Trust, in actuality, Williams never saw or received the payments. The
ents each month were mailed directly from the Commission to the Trust. The
ida Court of Appeals in J.G. Wentworth,
S.S.C.
v. Safeco
Life
Insurance
Co.,
So.2d 138 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), found a similarly creative paperwork
tegy to be an improper assignment, stating: "[T]he employee's agreement to
ge the beneficiary was simply part of the entire assignment of benefits
saction. Where documents are executed as part of the same transaction they
Id be considered together in determining their meaning and effect." Id. at
][7] f 22 We likewise view Williams's Irrevocable Letter of Direction to be
of the entire transaction with Florida Asset. In essence, Florida Asset,
h has a judgment against Williams, seeks to garnish Williams's disability
ents. Williams has now rescinded his voluntary direction to the Commission
ave his payments sent to the Trust. The Commission is required by statute
administrative rule to send payments directly to the worker. Furthermore,
's statute, by protecting benefits "from all claims of creditors" "before
tent" to employees, requires that the worker is entitled to actual receipt of
benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422
Only after such payment may a
ltor enforce an assignment. Although in Utah, a creditor is not expressly
lbited from obtaining an assignment of benefits after receipt by the worker,
s clear that such an arrangement is a "remedy or procedure for the recovery
ollection of a debt." In re Delgado,
967 F.2d 1466, 1468 (10th Cir.1992)
>tations and citation omitted). In this case Florida Asset obviously knew
@
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98 P.3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 200'
~he source of its collateral for Williams's debt.
[8] f 23 The Commission must comply with Williams's directions about where tc
send his disability payments. Any other result places the Commission in an
mtenable position of trying to determine the validity of an assignment or
agreement made by the worker, and forces the Commission to discern the
.egitimacy of a third party's claim to the benefits. This is contrary to the
)lain language of section 34A-2-422 and the public policy embodied therein.
This interpretation accomplishes the legislative purpose of assuring that, at
the time the employee receives the compensation, the money will be available,
intact, to him for use for the purpose for which it is intended--the support
of himself and his dependents during the period of his disability. He may, o
course, use the money for whatever purpose he deems advisable, but he can be
divested of his right to the money only as the result of his voluntary acts
after he has received it.
Highland
Park State
emphasis added).

Bank

v. Salazeir,

555 S.W.2d 484, 487-88 (Tex. App. 1977)

*443, f 24 We note that Williams may benefit by collecting disability payment
fter presumably having spent the loan proceeds he has failed to repay,
lthough the proper remedy for Williams's breach of contract with Florida Asset
s not to allow Florida Asset to force the Commission to bypass Williams and th<
tatutory structure for payment of benefits, Florida Asset retains its remedy o
^forcing its several judgments against Williams directly.
% 25 Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order granting Florida Asset's
Dtion for partial summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with
lis opinion.
% 2 6 WE CONCUR:
idge.

JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME,

IFNI.) In 1997, the Utah Industrial Commission was renamed the Utah Labor
Commission.
'FN2.) The nature of the breach is not specified in the parties' briefs. It is
also unclear whether or to what extent Florida Asset received funds in the
Trust.
FN3.) The Second Florida Judgment is not included in the record on appeal but
the parties do not dispute its content. Florida Asset describes the
$216,933.71 as principal, but we assume it must represent the principal sum of
$68,000 plus accrued interest and perhaps penalties and/or accelerated
payments. A copy of the promissory note is also not included in the record on
appeal.
FN4.) For detailed analysis of statutes and case law on the question of
2005 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

Page 11
3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004)
ther received award proceeds are exempt, see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,

idity,
±ers'

Construction,
Compensation

and Effect
Awards,

of Statutory

Exemptions

of Proceeds of

48 A.L.R. 5th 473, § 18, 534-47 (1997).

..) In Parker v. Industrial
Commission,
87 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (1935), the
Lrt considered whether the widow of an injured worker was, on behalf of the
ceased's estate, entitled to accrued compensation which was awarded but
>aid by the Commission prior to the worker's death. Id. at 278.
At the
ie this case was decided, Utah's exemption statute was located in Utah Code
lotated section 42-1-74 (1933), but the language was the same as that in
ih Code Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001) .
5.) We also note, however, that while a recipient could technically assign
3 right to future compensation payments, in Utah, such an assignment is not
zorceable against the Commission, and only against the recipient after
fment is received. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001) ("Compensation
:ore payment shall be exempt from all claims of creditors....").
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ROBERT B. HART #3806
HART & ASSOCIATES
349 South 200 East #110
Salt Lake CityUT 84111
Telephone: (801)534-1100
Facsimile: (801)534-1559
Attorney for Applicant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT WILLIAMS,
Applicant,
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY

vs.
MIKE PEERY TRUCKING,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

|
|
WC Claim No. 90-43881

Defendants.

STIPULATION FOR FINDING OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
The undersigned parties hereby agree and stipulate as follows:
1.
That the applicant, Robert Williams, was injured in a compensable industrial
accident on the 18th day of December, 1990, while in the course and scope of his
employment with Mike Peery Trucking.
2.
The applicant's industrial injury occurred while he was driving along State^
Road 80 in Summit County, Utah, and he was involved in an accident with several othc
vehicles. He received serious injuries including closed head injuries including hearing loss,!
and orthopedic injuries including back, shoulder, and knee injuries. He received multiple

facial and nasal injuries and he was given an impairment rating of 29% whoie person by Th.
Mark McGlothlin. The parties stipulate that there are pre-existing impairments in excess
of 10% whole person.
3*

The applicant was born on January 26,1944 and is 50 years of age.

4,
The Social Security Administration found the applicant was disabledfromand
after December 18, 1990. He is currently receiving disability benefits from that agency.
5«
Shortly after the applicant's industrial accident of December 18, 1990, the
applicant became temporarily, totally disabled and received compensationfromthe Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah in the amount of $56,418.88. In addition, he has received
permanent partial and permanent total benefits in the amount of $21,986.64, for a total of
$78,405.52 paid by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.
6.
The applicant has not worked continuously or meaningfully in any line of
substantial, gainful employment since his accident It appears to the parties that the
applicant is currently totally disabled and will in all likelihood not be able to return to work
again. The parties have concluded that the applicant has not been and is not now a viable
candidate for vocational rehabilitation because of his approaching advanced age and has no
transferrable skills, that referral for vocational rehabilitation evaluation would be an exercise
in futility; and, therefore, the parties respectfully request and stipulate to the waiver of
referral to vocational rehabilitation.
7.
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah is liable for the initial three (3) years of permanent total
disability and the first $20,000.00 of medical benefits. It is agreed that the compensation
payable during the initial six years amounts to $96,408.00. Fifty percent (50%) of this
amount equals $48,204.00, Because the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah has paid
$78,405.52, it is entitled to a refund from the Employers Reinsurance Fund of $30,201.52
leaving a balance owing by Employers Reinsurance Fund of $18,002.48. Medical expenses
have been paid by Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in the amount of $85,829.74 and
is entitled to reimbursement for fifty percent (50%) of all amounts from the Employers
Reinsurance Fund of Utah paid in excess of $20,000.00 upon the filing of duly verified
petition, certifying the amounts thus expended.
8.
The parties agree that applicant's attorney, Robert B, Hart, is entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fee for services in this matter, and request approval of the fee in the
sum of $7,500-00, less $3,362*82 paid to date. The Employers Reinsurance Fund shall pay
2

« •

• •

« •

applicant's attorney, Robert B. Hart, the balance of the attorneys tees in the amount of
$4=tSfrt2, said sum to be deducted from the portion of amounts due to'applk*n*.
9.
Beginning MuMgm^f 1,1994, the Employers Reimuranc«^ndggrees to pay
the applicant the sum of $£sra& per week, to and including December ^^w^Beginning
December « j 199JR the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund shall place the
applicant on the ERF permanent total disability payroll, effective December^, 199$ at the
rate of $309.00 per week. The ERF shall pay the applicant PTD of $309.00 per week, less
a fifty percent (50%) offset for any Social Security retirement benefits received by the
applicant. These benefits shall continue for as long as the applicant shall live or until further
order of the Commission,
10* The employer, Mike Peery Trucking, through it's insurance carrier, The
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, will pay all medical expenses arising out of the
industrial injury,
DATED this / °

day of November, 1994.

loben Williams
Applicant

Richard Sumsion, Esq.
Attorney for Employer and Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah

tobert B. Haft, Esq.
Attorney for Applicant

Attorney for Employers Reinsurance
Fund
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The foregoing stipulation has been reviewed and is approved by the Industrial
Commission of Utah. The provisions thereof are hereby incorporated into this Order as the
Order of the Commission. The attorney's fees of $7,500.00 to applicant's attorney is
specifically approved.
DATED this / / day of November, 1994.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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